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FIRST AMENDMENT-DISCONNECTING
DIAL-A-PORN: SECTION 223(b)'S TWO
PRONGED CHALLENGE TO FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829
(1989).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC,' the United States
Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)
of the Communications Act of 1934.2 After briefly summarizing the
history of modern obscenity law, the evolution of section 223(b),
and the Court's opinions in Sable, this Note addresses the majority's
decision that section 223(b)'s prohibition of indecent telephone
communications is unconstitutional. 3 This decision reaffirms the
right of adults to do, hear, or see that which may be inappropriate
for children. 4 This Note argues that although the majority reached
the correct result in this portion of the opinion, it erred in omitting
the interest of parents in the upbringing of their children from its
balancing of interests analysis. The Court thus laid a dangerous
foundation for the usurpation by the state of the parent's role.
This Note further argues, however, that in ruling that the ban
on indecent communications is unconstitutional, 5 the majority correctly indicated that it is inappropriate for judges to determine
which types of protected speech have the most value. The Court
thus maintained a two-tiered, definitional approach to obscenity
law, refusing to create intermediate categories of protected speech,
and maintaining an important safeguard of first amendment rights.
Second, this Note addresses the Court's decision to uphold section 223(b)'s provision prohibiting obscene telephone communica1 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989). FCC is the acronym for the Federal Communications
Commission.
2
3
4
5

See infra note 98.
Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2839.
See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2839.
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tions. 6 This Note argues that the Court avoided addressing the
issue of how the Miller requirement-that obscenity be judged by
contemporary community standards 7-is to be applied to telephone
pornography. This Note further argues that the majority wrongly
treats telephone communications as it has treated other methods of
communication in the past.8 This Note concludes that the major-

ity's decision does in effect what it purports not to do; it establishes
a national standard of obscenity, leaving dial-a-porn companies with
the difficult choice of tailoring their messages to the least tolerant
communities or risking prosecution and possible bankruptcy.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND:

A

BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN OBSCENITY LAW

THE OBSCENITY STANDARD

Modern obscenity law in the United States has its foundations
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.9 In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court
introduced the concept that the lewd and obscene are "limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem." 10
In Roth v. United States, I the Court attempted to arrive at a
clearer definition of obscenity but concluded only that because obscenity is utterly without redeeming social importance, "obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."' 12
This conclusion was modified by the Court's decision in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts.i3 There, a plurality of the Court set forth a new test
for obscenity. That test required: 1) that the dominant theme of
the material taken as a whole appeal to a prurient interest in sex; 2)
that the material be patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and 3) that the material be utterly without
redeeming social value.' 4 The Court's decision in Memoirs repre6
7
8
9

Id. at 2835.
See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
315 U.S. 568 (1942).

10 Id. at 571-572. The Court went on to say that "such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality." Id. at 572.
11 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
12 Id. at 485. The Court also stated that "all ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the [first amendment] guaran-

tees. ... " Id.
13 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
14 Id. at 418.
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sented a major shift from the Roth decision. Whereas in Roth, the
Court presumed that obscenity is utterly without redeeming social
value,' 5 Memoirs required that to prove obscenity the prosecution
affirmatively establish that the material is "utterly without redeeming social value."' 6 This burden was a heavy one for prosecutors,
because the defense could usually show that the material in question
7
had "redeeming social value" to some group of people.'
In Miller v. California,1 8 the Court rejected the Roth "utterly
without social value" test and instituted a tripartite test of its own. 19
The Miller Court held that the basic guidelines for the trier of fact
must be: 1) whether the average person, applying "contemporary
community standards," would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; 2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 3) whether the work, taken as a
20
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The Miller Court emphasized that the work in question must be
judged according to contemporary community standards and not by
a national standard.2 1 Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stated
that "it is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the
First Amendment as requiring that people of Maine or Missouri accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or
New York

City."

'22

In United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film,2 3 the Court held that
the standards enunciated in Miller, including the "contemporary
15 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
16 Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 419. Thus, in Roth, obscenity was unprotected because it was
utterly worthless, but in Memoirs, obscenity was unprotected only if utterly worthless. See
L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-16 at 908-909 (1988).
17 Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 459 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For this reason, Justice Harlan
questioned whether the "utterly without redeeming social value" test had any meaning
at all. Id.
18 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
19 Id. at 24. Miller did, however, retain as the first part of the test the formulation,
originating with Roth, that obscenity is material that appeals to the prurient interest. See
Roth, 354 U.S. at 488-89.
20 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Miller definition therefore made the burden on the
prosecution far lighter and paved the way for subsequent obscenity convictions.
21 Id. at 30.
22 Id. at 32. Justice Burger also stated:
[O]ur nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect
that such standards could be articulated for all fifty states in a single formulation,
even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists.... To require a state to structure
obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national "community standard" would
be an exercise in futility.
Id. at 30.
23 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
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community standards" requirement, 24 are applicable to federal legislation.2 5 Applying 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, the Court in Hamling v.
United States2 6 held that 18 U.S.C. § 146127 incorporated the Miller
standard of "the average person, applying contemporary community standards." 28 The Court thus upheld the application of Miller
to federal obscenity statutes, making clear that "the fact that distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to varying
community standards in the various federal judicial districts into
which they transmit the materials does not render a federal statute
unconstitutional."
B.

29

OBSCENITY AND THE ADULT'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY

°
In a holding consistent with the Court's decision in Roth,3
Miller reiterated that obscenity is not protected by the first amendment. 3 In Stanley v. Georgia,3 2 however, the Court held that a state
obscenity statute which punished the mere private possession of obscene material violates the first amendment.3 3 In Stanley, federal
34
and state agents found three reels of film in the appellant's home.
The agents subsequently concluded that the films were obscene. 3 5
The appellant was convicted for "knowingly hav[ing] possession of
...obscene matter" in violation of Georgia law. 3 6 The Supreme
Court reversed his conviction, 37 stating emphatically that "the right

Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. at 130. Here, the constitutionality of the Tariff Act
of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a), which prohibited the importing into the United States of
obscene materials, was upheld. Id.
26 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
27 18 U.S.C. § 1461 prohibited the use of the mails to convey any "obscene, lewd,
lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461 (1974).
28 Hamling, 418 U.S. at 104.
29 Id. at 106. The Court rejected Justice Brennan's argument that by holding that a
federal obscenity case may be tried on local community standards, the Court was doing
violence to Congress' decision and to the Constitution. Id. One commentator has suggested that mailed packages always have an intended destination and, therefore, the
relevant community is the one in which materials come in contact with the group that
the statute is designed to protect from the materials. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENrrY 129 (1976).
30 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
31 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
24
25

32
33
34
35
36
37

394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 568.

Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 558-59.
Id. at 568.
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to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is
fundamental to our free society." 3 8 Justice Marshall then stated:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a state has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at3 the
thought of giving government the power to control
9
men's minds.
Although a right to receive obscenity and to possess it in one's
home seems to suggest a corresponding right to distribute such
materials, 40 the Court was quick to reaffirm the constitutionality of
prohibiting the distribution or sale of obscene materials, even to
consenting adults. In United States v. Reidel,4 t the Court declined to
overrule Roth, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 146142 is not unconstitutional as applied to the distribution of obscene materials to willing
adult recipients. 43 Similarly, in United States v. Orito,4 4 the Court held
that the government has the power to prevent obscene material
from entering the stream of commerce. 45 The Court stated in dicta
that the constitutionally protected zone of privacy does not extend
46
beyond the home.
In 12 200-ft. Reels of Film,47 moreover, the Court held that Congress may constitutionally proscribe the importation of obscene
matter even if that material is for the personal and private use and
possession of the importer. 48 Finally, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 49 the Court found that for purposes of privacy rights, a commer38 Id. at 564 (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
39 Id. at 565.

40 It seemed, indeed, that the reasoning in Stanley could be extended to allow consenting adults to obtain obscenity. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 29, at 66.
41 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
42 See supra note 27.

43 Reidel, 402 U.S. at 356.

44 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
45 Id. at 143.

46 Id. In this case, Orito was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1462 for "knowingly
transportting] and carry[ing] in interstate commerce from San Francisco ...to Milwaukee... by means of a common carrier... copies of [specified] obscene, lewd, lascivious,
and filthy materials." Id. at 140. The Supreme Court upheld Orito's conviction. Justice
Douglas dissented from the Court's opinion, stating that under Stanley, a person reading
an obscene book on an airplane or train or carrying an obscene book in his pocket during ajourney for his own personal pleasure is subject to prosecution, and that 18 U.S.C.
§ 1462's ban on such interstate carriage was therefore overbroad. Id. at 146 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
47 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
48 Id. at 128. The Court stated that to allow the importation of obscene matters for
the importer's personal and private use would be like compelling the Government to
permit importation of illegal or controlled drugs for private consumption as long as
such drugs are not for public distribution or sale. Id.
49 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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cial theater cannot be equated with a private home. 5 0 The Court
explained that there is no zone of privacy that follows a consumer of
obscenity wherever he goes. 5 1 The Court held, therefore, that Congress has the power to prohibit obscene movies in commercial theatres. 5 2 Through these holdings, the Court clearly limited the Stanley
holding 53 strictly to its facts.
C.

INDECENT MATERIALS AND THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN

Although the Court has deemed obscenity to be unprotected,
speech that lacks prurient appeal may be labelled merely "indecent," and therefore worthy of constitutional protection. 54 Nevertheless, the Court has recognized that the protection of indecent
material is limited, distinguishing between material that is acceptable for adults and material that is acceptable for children. 5 5 The
concept that identical materials might be acceptable for adults but
not acceptable for children was directly acknowledged in Butler v.
Michigan.5 6 In Butler, the Supreme Court invalidated a Michigan
statute making it an offense to sell, distribute, or otherwise make
available to the public a publication "tending to the corruption of
the morals of youth." 5 7 The Court found that because the statute
"reduce[d] the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is
fit for children,"5 8 it was not reasonably restricted to the evil with
which it was said to deal. 59 Butler therefore introduced the idea that
statutes aimed at regulating sexually oriented speech to protect children must be narrowly tailored to that purpose.
The Court explicitly affirmed the protection of minors from
"indecent" materials as a compelling state interest in Ginsberg v. State
of New York. 60 The Ginsberg Court upheld a statute prohibiting the
sale to minors under seventeen years old of material defined to be
50 Id. at 65.
51 Id. at 66.

52 Id. at 69.
53 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).

54 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
55 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978).
56 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
57 Id. at 381-83.
58 Id. at 383.
59 Id. In the words ofJustice Frankfurter, Butler was a case of "burn[ing] the house to
roast the pig." Id. Butler was primarily based on the doctrine of "the least restrictive
alternative." This doctrine says that if the state may potentially infringe upon some
fundamental right such as freedom of speech, then the valid government interest may be
furthered only in the manner which represents the smallest encroachment on the rights
involved. F. SCHAUER, supra note 29 at 156-57.
60 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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obscene on the basis of its appeal to them regardless of whether it
was obscene to adults. 6 ' In so doing, the Court emphasized the
state interest in the well-being of its youth, stating that this interest
"justiflies] the limitations ... upon the availability of sex material to
minors under 17, at least if it was rational for the legislature to find
that the minors' exposure to such material might be harmful." 62
The Court noted that "parents and ...

teachers ...

who have this

primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the
support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." 63
The Court also noted the state's independent interest in the wellbeing of its youth, to promote their "growth into free and independent well-developed" persons. 64 The Court's decision to uphold the
statute prohibiting minors from buying indecent materials was consistent with Butler 6 5 because it did not diminish the rights of adults
to buy materials not fit for children.
In FCC v. Pacifica Found.,66 the Court held that the FCC had the
power to regulate a radio broadcast that was indecent but not obscene. 67 The Court, in an explicitly narrow holding, found that indecent broadcasting merited special treatment. 68 In Pacifica, a father
heard an afternoon radio broadcast of George Carlin's monologue
entitled "Filthy Words" while he was driving with his young son. 69
The father complained to the FCC.7 0 The FCC, in a memorandum
opinion, stated that it intended to "clarify the standards which will
be utilized in considering" the growing number of complaints concerning indecent speech on the airwaves. 7 1 The Commission found:
the concept of "indecent" is intimately connected with the exposure of
children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as mea61 Id. at 649-50.
62 Id. at 639.
63 Id.

64 Id. at 640 (citing Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165
(1944)). Justice Fortas, in his dissent, voiced his discontent with the Court's decision
because he felt it "give[s] the State a role in the rearing of children which is contrary to
our traditions and to our conception of family responsibility." Id. at 674 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting).
65 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
66 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
67 Id. at 738.
68 Id.

729-30.
730.
71 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). The FCC found a power to regulate indecent broadcasting
in two statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) (forbidding the use of "any obscene, indecent,
or profane language by means of radio communications"); and 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (requiring the FCC to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public
interest"); see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 731 (1978).
69 Id. at
70 Id. at
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sured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs at times of the day
when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience. 7 2
The FCC concluded that because the Carlin monologue was deliberately broadcast "when children were undoubtedly in the audience," the language as broadcast was indecent and prohibited by 18
7
U.S.C. § 1464. 3
The Supreme Court upheld the FCC's findings. 74 Stating that
"indecency is largely a function of context-it cannot be adequately
judged in the abstract," 7 5 the Court concluded that the constitutional protection accorded a communication containing patently offensive sexual and excretory language does not have to be identical
in every context. 7 6 The Court went on to find that the unique attributes of broadcasting amply justify special treatment of indecent
broadcasting. 77 However, the Court emphasized the narrowness of
its holding; it was to be limited to the facts of Pacifica. Thus, the
Pacifica decision was not to be considered precedent for the regula78
tion of indecent speech in other contexts.
III.

THE EvoLurION OF 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)

The original version of 47 U.S.C. § 223 of the Communications
Act of 1934, as passed in 1968, prohibited obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy or indecent communications by means of the telephone. 79 In
1983, the statute was amended to permit obscene and indecent
communications to adults but not to children.8 0 The amended statute also required the FCC to promulgate regulations laying out
methods by which dial-a-porn services could screen calls from un56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
Id. at 99. In a clarification of its opinion, the FCC issued another opinion in which
it stated that it "never intended to place an absolute prohibition on the broadcast of this
type of language but rather sought to channel it to times of day when children most
likely would not be exposed to it." 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976).
74 Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 751.
75 Id. at 742.
76 Id. at 747.
77 Id. at 748-50. The Court found specifically that 1) the broadcast media has established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans, and 2) broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to young children. Id.
72
73

78

Id. at 750.

79 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(A) (1982).
80 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(1)(A) (1982). The relevant provision of the 1983 amendment
to § 223 made it a crime to use telephone facilities to make "obscene or indecent" interstate telephone communications "for commercial purposes to any person under eighteen years of age or to any other person without that person's consent." Id.
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derage callers. 8 ' Under the statute, compliance with such regula82
tions constituted a defense to prosecution.
The FCC, responding to the 1983 amendment, made several
attempts to satisfy the requirement of formulating telephone communications regulations. The first set of regulations promulgated
by the FCC required "time channeling," a method that placed restrictions on the times of day that dial-a-porn was available. 83 This
regulatory scheme was set aside in Carlin Communications Inc. v. FCC
(Carlin /)84 because the Second Circuit found it to be both overinclusive and underinclusive and therefore not well-tailored to its ends. 8 5
On October 22, 1985, the FCC released a second set of regulations which required authorized access codes or payment by credit
card. 86 Under the access and identification code requirement, diala-porn providers were required to issue personal identification
numbers or authorization codes to requesting adult customers. 8 7
Transmission of dial-a-porn messages would not occur until an authorized access code was communicated by the subscriber to the service provider.8 8 Because of economic and technical infeasibility, the
FCC rejected a proposal for "exchange blocking," a method which
would block or screen telephone numbers at the customer's premises or at the phone company's offices. 8 9 The Second Circuit set
aside this set of regulations, finding that the FCC had failed to consider sufficiently the possibility of exchange blocking. 90
In 1987, the FCC promulgated a third set of regulations. 9 '
These regulations added the defense of message scrambling to the
81 Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2833 (1989); see also
Second Report and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699, 42,700 n.l 1 (1985).
82 See Second Report and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699, 42,700 n. 11 (1985).
83 Time channeling required operation of dial-a-porn services only between the
hours of 9 p.m. and 8 a.m. eastern time. 47 C.F.R. § 64.201(a) (1983).
84 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984).
85 Id. at 121. The court did not declare the regulations impermissible. Instead, it
held that the record was insufficiently developed to uphold the regulations and that the
FCC did not show convincingly that the first set of regulations was chosen after thorough, careful, and comprehensive investigation and analysis. Id. at 123.
86 Second Report and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699, 42,705-06 (1985). Under the
second set of regulations, each offeror of dial-a-porn had to develop an identification
code system where, before receiving a message, the caller would have to provide an
access number or a credit card for identification. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2834.
87 Second Report and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699, 42,704-05 (1985).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 42,702-03. For a detailed description of the types of blocking rejected by the
FCC in its Second Report, see Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC (Carlin II), 787 F.2d
847, 852-55 (2d Cir. 1986).

90 Carlin H, 787 F.2d at 855-56.

91 52 Fed. Reg. 17,760 (1987).
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earlier defenses of access codes and credit card payment. 92 This defense permitted providers of dial-a-porn to scramble their messages,
making them unintelligible unless a descrambler was used. 93 The
sale of descramblers was to be limited to adults. 9 4 After considering
exchange blocking, the FCC again rejected it as a possibility at that
time. 95 Reviewing the third set of regulations, the Second Circuit
held that the regulations were a "feasible and effective way to serve"
the compelling state interest in protecting minors. 96 The court then
instructed the FCC to reopen proceedings if any less restrictive
97
technology became available.
In April, 1988, Congress amended section 223(b) to completely
prohibit all obscene and indecent interstate commercial telephone
communications. 9 8 This ban on dial-a-porn was total, making it illegal for adults as well as children to have access to dial-a-porn. 99
Thus, section 223(b) eliminated the FCC's duty to promulgate regulations for restricting access to minors.10 0 This version of section
223(b) was in effect when Sable commenced its action.' 0 1
92 Id.
93 Id. at 17,761.

Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2834 (1989).
Id.; see Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC (CarlinII1), 837 F.2d 546, 554 (2d Cir.
1988).
96 Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 555.
97 Id. at 556.
98 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988). The text of amended § 223(b) is as follows:
(b)(1) Whoever knowingly(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by
means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device) any obscene or indecent communication for commercial purposes to any person, regardless of whether
the maker of such communication placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for an
activity prohibited by subparagraph (A), shall be fined not more than $50,000 or
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
Id.
99 Id.
100 Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2834 (1989).
101 Id. The version that was in effect when Sable commenced its action was again
amended by § 7524 of the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988.
The most recent version of 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) states in pertinent part:
(b)(1) Whoever knowingly(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by
means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device) any obscene communication for commercial purposes to any person, regardless of whether the maker of
such communication placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for an
activity prohibited by clause (i), shall be fined in accordance with title 18 of the
United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, by
means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device) any indecent communi94
95
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sable is a Los Angeles based affiliate of Carlin Communications, Inc. 10 2 Since 1983, Sable has been offering pre-recorded, sexually oriented messages.10 3 To provide this service, Sable uses
special telephone lines provided by Pacific Bell.' 0 4 Those who call
the message number are charged a fee for their calls. 10 5 Sable receives part of the revenue from the phone calls and Pacific Bell receives the remainder.' 0 6 Callers outside the Los Angeles area code
are also able to hear phone messages by making long distance toll
10 7
calls to Los Angeles.
In 1988, Sable commenced an action in the federal district
court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement
of the recently amended section 223(b). l0 8 First, Sable wished to
enjoin any criminal investigation or prosecution, civil action, or administrative proceeding under the statute.' 0 9 Second, Sable challenged the provisions of the statute prohibiting all obscene and
indecent phone messages as unconstitutional under the first and
t °
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 1
The district court, rejecting Sable's argument that the statute
was unconstitutional because it created a national standard of obscenity, denied Sable's request for a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of section 223(b)'s prohibition of obscene phone
messages.I' The district court then held, however, that the provication for commercial purposes to any person, regardless of whether the maker of
such communication placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be used for
any activity prohibited by clause (i), shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988).
Furthermore, § 223(b) in its final form is enforceable only through criminal proceedings and not through the FCC's administrative proceedings. Sable, 109 S. Ct. at
2834, n.5.
102 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2832.
103 Id. The amended version of § 223(b) was passed in 1983, legalizing dial-a-porn;
see supra notes 80-82.
104 Id. A typical prerecorded message may be called by up to 50,000 people hourly
through a single telephone number. Comment, Telephones, Sex, and the FirstAmendment,
33 UCLA L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1986).
105 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2832.
106 Id.
107 Id. Sable does not receive revenues from out of state calls, however. Brief of Appellant at 38, Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989) (Nos.
88-515, 88-525).
108 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2632.
109 Id.
110 Id.
I' Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 692 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (C.D. Cal.
1988).
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sion banning "indecent speech" was unconstitutionally overbroad
because it was not narrowly drawn to achieve the government's legitimate interest in protecting children from indecent dial-a-porn
messages. 1 2 The district court therefore issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of section 223(b) with respect
' 13
to allegedly "indecent communications." "
Sable appealed the obscenity ruling, and the FCC cross appealed the ruling on indecent telephone communications.1" 4 The,
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on both the appeal and
15
the cross appeal."
V.
A.

SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

In Sable, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding
that 1) section 223(b) is constitutional with respect to its ban of all
obscene telephone communications," 16 and 2) that section 223(b)'s
ban of all telephone communications alleged to be indecent is unconstitutional." 1 7 Justice White delivered the majority opinion. 1 I8
1.

The Obscenity Holding

Justice White began by stating that the Court's duty was to determine "whether Congress is empowered to prohibit transmission
of obscene telephonic communications," '1 19 not to decide what is
112
113
114
115

Id.
Id.
Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2832.
Id. Sable Communications appealed the district court ruling to the Court of Ap-

peals for the Ninth Circuit and concurrently filed an emergency motion for an injunction
pending appeal. The district court entered an order temporarily enjoining the FCC
from enforcing the statute during pendency of the appeal. After the government filed its
notice of appeal .to the Supreme Court from the district court's grant of the preliminary
injunction as to "indecent" communications, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
entered an order directing Sable Communications either to file a motion for voluntary
dismissal or to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. Sable Communications filed an ex parte application to the Supreme Court for an
injunction pending appeal. The court of appeals entered an order dismissing the appeal
since the filing of a direct appeal by the FCC had the effect of transferring Sable Communications' appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. at 2832-33, n.2.
116 Id. at 2835. See supra note 98 for the text of § 223(b).
117 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2836.
118 Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined in Parts
I, II, and IV of the opinion. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan
filed an opinion concurring in parts I, II, and IV and dissenting in Part III, in which
Justices Marshall and Stevens joined.
119 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2835.
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obscene or indecent.120
The majority emphasized that the protection of the first amendment does not extend to obscene speech. 12 1 Justice White then
went on to reject Sable's argument that the obscenity provision was
unconstitutional because it created a national standard for obscenity, thus placing message senders in a "double bind" by forcing
them either to conform their messages to the standards of the least
22
tolerant community or go out of business.'
In rejecting Sable's "national standard" argument, the majority
examined the Court's prior decisions regarding federal statutes
which prohibit the distribution of obscene materials.' 2 3 Using
Reidel124 as a starting point, the Court embarked on an analysis of
whether section 223(b) establishes a "national standard" of obscenity, thus contravening the "contemporary community standards" requirement of Miller.'2 5 The Court referred to its decision in 12 200ft. Reels of Film' 2 6 to support the proposition that the Miller formulation of "contemporary community standards" applies to federal legislation. 12 7 Justice White added that " 'the fact that distributors of
allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to varying community
standards in the various judicial districts into which they transmit
the materials does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of the failure of application of uniform national standards of
obscenity.' "128
On the basis of 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 129 the majority held that
120 Id.

121 Id. This principle has been firmly established by the Court in prior cases. See Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20
(1973).
122 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2835. In its brief, Sable discusses the unfairness of requiring
citizens of areas such as Las Vegas or New York City to conform to the standards of
Maine or Mississippi. Brief of Appellant at 45, Sable (Nos. 88-515, 88-525) (citing Miller,
413 U.S. at 32).
123 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2835.
124 United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 354 (1971). See supra, notes 41-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of Reidel.
125 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2835 (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24). Miller set forth three criteria
for determining whether materials are obscene. See supra note 20 for these criteria.
126 United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973). See supra notes 2325 and accompanying text for discussion of 12 200-ft. Reels of Film.
127 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2835 (citing 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. at 130).
128 109 S. Ct. at 2835-36 (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974)).
In Hamling, the petitioners were convicted of mailing and conspiring to mail an obscene
advertising brochure in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, which provided in pertinent part
that "[wihoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing of... anything declared by this
section to be nonmailable . . ." commits a crime. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 98, n.8. The
Hamling Court found that 18 U.S.C. § 1461 did not contravene the Miller standard. Id.
129 413 U.S. at 123.
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"section 223(b) no more establishes a 'national standard of obscenity' than do federal statutes prohibiting the mailing of obscene
materials." 130 Responding to Sable's argument that it is unfair to
make Sable conform its messages to satisfy the least tolerant community, Justice White added that although Sable might incur costs
in developing and implementing a system for screening the locale of
incoming calls, there is no constitutional impediment to enacting a
law which may impose such costs on a company electing to provide
131
such services.
2.

The Indecency Holding

In the final section of its opinion, the Court held that section
223(b) was not narrowly tailored to serve the legitimate government
interest of protecting children from exposure to indecent telephone
messages.1 3 2 After reiterating the generally recognized principle
that the government may regulate constitutionally protected speech
in order to promote a compelling interest so long as it chooses the
least restrictive means of promoting that interest, 3 3 Justice White
identified the government's compelling interest as the protection of
"the physical and psychological well-being of minors." 13 4 This interest, stated Justice White, was sufficient to justify protecting minors from the influence of materials that would not be obscene by
adult standards.13 5 He emphasized, however, the Butler Court's
holding that a statute which made it an offense to make available to
the general public materials found to have a potentially harmful effect on minors was insufficiently tailored since it limited the adult
population to only those materials fit for children.' 3 6
The majority's task in Sable was to determine whether the route
chosen by Congress to promote its compelling interest of preventing minors' exposure to dial-a-porn, namely section 223(b)'s blanket prohibition on all indecent telephone communications, was a
Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2835 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973)).
131 109 S. Ct. at 2836. The Court also stated that "if Sable's audience is comprised of
different communities with different local standards, Sable ultimately bears the burden
of complying with the prohibition on obscene messages." Id.
130

132 Id.
133 Id. (citing Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980);
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, (1978); Hynes v. Mayor of
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976)).
134 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2836 (1989).
135 Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968) (Court upheld statute banning sale to minors of material defined to be obscene to children regardless of
whether materials obscene to adults)).
136 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2836 (citing Butler, 352 U.S. at 380).
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narrowly tailored effort to serve that interest. 3 7 In deciding that
section 223(b) was not narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of protecting children from the effects of dial-a-porn, 1 3 8 the Court first
distinguished Sable from Pacifica,13 9 the case relied on by the FCC to
justify section 223(b)'s complete ban on indecent commercial telephone communications.' 40 This distinction was made on two
grounds. First, Justice White noted that the FCC rule at issue in
Pacifica did not place an absolute ban on the broadcast of all "dirty"
words, but instead sought to " 'channel it to times of day when children most likely would not be exposed to it.' 1,41
Second, the majority noted substantial differences between the
broadcast media involved in Pacifica and the telephone communications involved in Sable. 14 2 Justice White pointed out that in Pacifica,
143
the Court relied on the special characteristics of broadcasting.
Justice White then stated that in contrast to the public radio broadcast at issue in Pacifica, the dial-a-porn medium requires the listener
to take affirmative steps to receive the communication.144 "There is
no 'captive audience' problem here," he stated, because "callers will
generally not be unwilling listeners."' 14 5 Justice White then emphasized the narrowness of the Pacifica holding, 4 6 reiterating that the
government may not reduce the adult population to doing only
147
what is fit for children.
After rejecting the FCC's arguments derived from Pacifica, the
majority addressed the FCC's argument that the total ban on indecent telephone communications was justified because nothing less
could prevent minors from listening to the messages. 14 8 The Court
137 Id.
138 Id.

139 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); seesupra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
140 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2836-37.
141 Id. at 2837 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 733). Although the statute at issue in
Pacifica, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976), provides that "[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent,
or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined no more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both," the Pacifica Court also looked
to 47 U.S.C. § 303(g), requiring the FCC to "encourage the larger and more effective
use of radio in the public interest." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731, 731 n.3. The Court interpreted these two statutes as an attempt to channel behavior, not to prohibit it. Id.
142 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2837.
143 Id. (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49); see supra note 77 and accompanying text.
144 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2837.
145 Id. Justice White underscored this point by stating that "a message received by
one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or surprising that it
prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it." Id.
146 Id.

147 Id. (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
148 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2837.
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recalled that in Carlin Communications (CarlinIII), 14 9 the Second Circuit concluded that the regulations promulgated by the FCC were a
"feasible and effective" way to serve the government interest of
preventing minors from gaining access to dial-a-porn.15 0 Expressing his unwillingness to defer to Congress' decisions concerning
first amendment rights,15 1 Justice White observed that the congressional record contained no legitimate findings tojustify a conclusion
that a total ban was the least restrictive means to achieve the government's goal. 152 Moreover, he stated that the Congressional Record
contained no evidence as to the effectiveness of the FCC's third set
of regulations.' 53 Justice White explained that "for all we know
from this record, the FCC's technological approach to restricting
dial-a-porn messages to adults who seek them would be extremely
effective, and only a few of the most enterprising and disobedient
154
young people will manage to secure access to such messages."'
He concluded the Court's opinion by reiterating that section
223(b)'s denial of adult access to indecent, but not obscene, telephone messages was a clear case of" 'burning up the house to roast
the pig,' "and therefore could not survive constitutional scrutiny.155
B.

JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRING OPINION

Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion, 15 6 but was dubious
about the assumptions underlying the reasoning used by the majority to find section 223(b)'s ban of indecent speech unconstitutional. 157 Specifically, Justice Scalia questioned the reasoning
through which the Court concluded that section 223(b) was not narrowly tailored to serve the government's goal of protecting children
58
from dial-a-porn.
Justice Scalia first referred to Justice White's statement con149 Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988).
150 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2837 (quoting Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 555). The FCC regulations approved by the Second Circuit were credit card payment, access codes, and
message scrambling. Id.; see supra notes 91-97.
151 Sable, 109 S.Ct. at 2838 (citing Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 843 (1978) (deference to a legislative finding does not limit judicial inquiry
when first amendment rights at stake)).
152 Sable, 109 S.Ct. at 2838.
153 Id.
154 Id.

Id. at 2839 (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
Id. at 2839 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
158 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
155
156
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cerning the effectiveness of the FCC's third set of regulations. 159
The flaw in the majority's reasoning, noted Justice Scalia, was that it
could just as easily have come to the conclusion that section 223(b)
was narrowly tailored to fit the government's purpose. 160 Justice
Scalia hypothesized that the majority would have reached this alternative conclusion had it instead stated that "we know ...

that the

FCC's technological approach to restricting dial-a-porn messages to
adults who seek them would be inadequate, since some enterprising
and disobedient young people will manage to secure access to such
messages . *.".."161
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion because
of his belief that a ban on adult access to indecent telephone communications could not be adopted "merely because the FCC's alternate [third] proposal could be circumvented by as few children as
the evidence suggests." 1 62 He emphasized the value judgments involved in Sable: how few children render the risk unacceptable depends in part upon what the categories of indecency and obscenity
include. 163 Finally, he observed that as the meaning of "obscene"
becomes narrower so that more pornographic materials are deemed
indecent, "the more reasonable it becomes to insist upon greater
assurance of insulation from minors."164
C.

JUSTICE BRENNAN'S

DISSENT IN THE OBSCENITY RULING

While agreeing with the Court's decision to strike down section
223(b)'s ban of indecent speech, Justice Brennan criticized the
Court for upholding section 223(b)'s ban of obscene telephone
communications.1 6 5 According to Justice Brennan, section 223(b)'s
complete criminal ban of obscene commercial telephone messages
is " 'unconstitutionally overbroad, and therefore invalid on its
face' " as a means for achieving the government's goal of protecting
166
children from pornography.
Justice Brennan argued that the majority should have used the
159 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). See supra note 154 and accompanying text for Justice
White's statement.
160 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2839 (Scalia, J., concurring).
161 Id. (ScaliaJ., concurring).
162 Id. (Scalia, J.. concurring).
163 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
164 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia went on to discuss the blurriness of the
line between "obscene" and "indecent." He predicted that not all sexual activity portrayed over the phone lines would fall outside of the obscenity portion of the statute. Id.
165 Id. at 2840 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens.
166 Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 47 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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same standard to judge both the obscenity and the indecency provisions of section 223(b).' 6 7 In his opinion, only a compelling state
interest can justify the prohibition of speech, whether it is obscene
or indecent.' 68 Justice Brennan emphasized that the prohibition of
the transmission of all obscene messages is "unduly heavy handed"
because the third set of regulations promulgated by the FCC was
found to be an effective way to serve the government's interest in
1 69
safeguarding children.
Justice Brennan concluded his brief opinion by chastizing the
majority for its decision upholding the ban on obscenity. This ban,
he noted, was a completely unwarranted, "draconian restriction on
the first amendment rights of adults who seek to hear the messages
70
that Sable and others provide."'
VI.
A.

ANALYSIS

THE INDECENCY HOLDING

The Sable Court's holding that section 223(b)'s' 7 ' ban on indecent speech was unconstitutional

72

is, on the whole, a victory for

the first amendment. First, it reinforces the Butler Court's holding
that Congress cannot limit adults to seeing, hearing, or doing only
that which is appropriate for children. 73 That reinforcement, however, is undercut by the Court's refusal to frame the issue in terms
of the right of parents to control the education and upbringing of
their children. Second, by refusing to extend the Pacifica Court's
holding to Sable, the Court has indicated a laudable unwillingness to
create intermediate categories of protected speech, thereby reaffirming the right of ordinary citizens to judge the value of protected
174
speech for themselves.
The issue of whether section 223(b)'s ban of indecent commercial telephone communications is constitutional necessarily reflects
a tension between three interests: 1) the government's compelling
interest in protecting children from indecent materials; 2) the rights
of adults to have access to materials that are inappropriate for children but not obscene; and 3) the right of parents to decide whether
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2841 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See supra note 27 for the text of the statute.
Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2839.
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); see supra notes 58-59.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see supra notes 66-78 and accompany-

ing text.
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their children are exposed to such materials.' 75 The Court correctly
reached the conclusion in Sable that adults cannot be limited to hearing only that which is appropriate for the ears of children, thus reaffirming Butler.' 7 6 However, the Court wrongly ignored the third
interest, that of parents, in reaching its decision.177
The primary role of parents in the upbringing of their children
has been established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.1 78 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 179 the Court observed that "[a]
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."'' 80 The
Court later defined these "additional obligations" to include "the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of
' 8
good citizenship."' '
The importance of parental responsibility has been particularly
noted in the area of obscenity law. In Ginsberg,182 the Court emphasized that "parents' claim to authority in their own household to
direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society."' 8 3 Similarly, in Pacifica, the Court's goal in restricting
hours during which indecent programs could be broadcast was to
175 See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (examining competing interests in the broadcast context). In its brief, Sable focused on the
third interest-that of parents to decide what is and is not appropriate for their children.
According to Sable, the government's interest is to aid parents in bringing up their children, rather than an independent interest in the development of America's youth. Brief
of Appellant at 22, Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989)
(Nos. 88-515, 88-525).
176 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). Although Sable reaffirms Butler, the Court
was not willing to apply the Butler Court's holding unconditionally to Sable. The Court
created an implicit caveat to its affirmation of Butler, basing its decision that § 223(b) was
not narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest on the findings of the Second
Circuit that the FCC's third set of regulations was a "feasible and effective" way to serve
the government's interest in protecting children from dial-a-porn. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text. Thus, should the third set of regulations prove not to be "feasible
and effective," the Court might find that a ban on indecent telephone communications is
indeed the least restrictive means of serving the government's purpose. But see Fabulous
Assocs. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Co., 693 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (new technology makes blocking of dial-a-porn numbers possible) (supports the proposition that
other screening methods must be considered before a blanket ban is effected).
177 See Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156
(1980) [hereinafter Developments].

178 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
179 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
180 Id. at 535.
181 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.

182 Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See supra notes 60-65 and
accompanying text for discussion of Ginsberg.
183 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.

1990]

DIAL-A-PORN

987

aid parents in supervising their children.18 4
The fundamental role of parents in making choices for their
children and in deciding how to raise them should not become suddenly irrelevant when the medium at issue is the telephone instead
of broadcasting or print. Because they are received in the home,
dial-a-porn messages are more subject to parental control than, for
example, pornographic magazines that children look at on a school
playground during recess. Thus, parents can make educated judgments, based on the stage of development of their children, about
whether their children should or should not be permitted to hear
dial-a-porn messages. This important right of parents should not be
85
usurped by the government.'
Because the responsibility for controlling children lies with parents, it is the individual responsibility of parents who believe that
certain material is inappropriate for their children to take steps to
prevent their children from gaining access to it.186 If parents are
unwilling to do so, the inference may be drawn that the parents are
not overly concerned with the issue. If parents do not suppress or
willingly receive dial-a-porn, the government should not have the
87
right to undermine the parents' decision.
By not considering this argument as part of its rationale for declaring section 223(b)'s ban on indecent communications unconstitutional, the Court overemphasized the independent interest of the
state in the welfare of America's youth. The Court's decision in essence violates the principles of Yoder 18 8 by taking the job of instilling
morality in children out of the hands of parents and putting it into
the hands of the state. Thus, the Sable Court's reasoning comes danId. at 750. The Court stated:
We held in Ginsberg . . . that the government's interest in the "well-being of its
youth" and in supporting "parents' claim to authority in their own household" justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression ....
The ease with which
children may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment for indecent broadcasting.
Id.
185 One commentator has noted that:
Unlike parental authority ... the state's authority is not supported by such rationales as the bonds of love and kinship in a parent-child relationship, parental knowledge of a particular child's needs, and society's interest in pluralism. Accordingly,
the state should be entitled to less authority over a child's free speech activities than
the child's parent.
Cleary, Telephone Pornography: First Amendment Constraintson Shielding Childrenfrom Dial-aPorn, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503, 526 (1985).
186 Developments, supra note 177, at 1201.
187 In Erzoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975), the Court held
that the state may not curtail first amendment rights "solely to protect the young from
ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them." Id.
188 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-215 (1972); see supra notes 178-181.
184
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gerously close to suggesting that parents do not make the ultimate
decisions about what their children may and may not do.
The Court instead should have emphasized that the government's proper interest is in helping parents to control their children's access to dial-a-porn. 18 9 The government can best exercise
its interest by finding a "feasible and effective" way to protect minors from exposure to sexually-oriented material. 190 Placing an emphasis on the government's role of aiding parents would
demonstrate the recognition of and respect for the responsibility of
parents for the upbringing of their children by maintaining parents'
rights to make ultimate decisions about what their children may do.
At the same time, such emphasis would not reduce adult access to
protected speech. Therefore, had the Court paid more attention to
the parent's right to raise his or her child, it would have simultaneously served the interests of parents, adults, and the government.
Although the Court erred in ignoring the fundamental interest
of parents in raising their children, it correctly declined to extend
the reasoning which the Pacifica Court used to uphold a partial ban
of indecent broadcasting' 9 1 to the complete ban of indecent telephone communications at issue in Sable. The Court thus reaffirmed
a two-tiered, definitional approach to obscenity law, rejecting a variable approach in which the Court freely creates intermediate catego92
ries of protected speech.'
A strictly definitional approach involves two categories of
materials: obscene materials, which are not protected by the first
amendment; 9 3 and non-obscene materials, which require first
amendment protection.194 Using a variable obscenity approach, the
materials in question are evaluated by looking to the context of their
distribution and the state's interest in the particular form of
regulation.

95

189 See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The FCC's general counsel conceded at oral argument that the FCC did "not propose to
act in loco parentis and to deny children's access contrary to parents' wishes." Id. The
Court therefore concluded that the government's interest in protecting children from
indecent material merged with the interest of parents to decide whether their children
are exposed to such material. The government's role, therefore, was to "facilitate parental supervision of children's listening." Id.
190 See Comment, supra note 104, at 1241. Here, the author hypothesized that exchange blocking would be a feasible and effective way to limit children's access to dial-aporn and would at the same time serve all three interests. Id.
191 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978).
192 See Schauer, The Return of Variable Obscenity, 28 HAST. LJ. 1275 (1977).
193 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
194 Id.
195 Schauer,

supra note 192, at 1277-79.
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The definitional/variable model applies to cases involving the
prohibition of sexually explicit but non-obscene materials. 196
Under a definitional theory, such indecent speech is protected by
the first amendment simply because it is not obscene. 197 Under a
variable approach, however, indecent speech is evaluated by the
government on the basis of context of distribution and state's interest, a far more subjective standard. 198 The result is that intermediate categories of protected speech are created.
The Court addressed the concept of intermediate categories of
protected speech in Pacifica.'9 9 There, Justice Stevens, writing for
the majority, hypothesized that because dirty words offend people
for the same reasons that obscenity does, dirty words do not merit
first amendment protection. 20 0 He then stated:
In this case it is undisputed that the content of Pacifica's broadcast was
"vulgar," "offensive," and "shocking." Because content of that character is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances, we must consider its context in order to determine
whether the
Commission's [regulation] was constitutionally
20
permissible. '
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Pacifica, argued that
the majority could not justify its creation of an intermediate standard for judging speech. 20 2 He criticized the majority for subscribing to the theory that Supreme Court justices are free to decide the
value of speech protected by the first amendment on the basis of its
content. 20 3 Justice Powell emphasized that the judgment of how
much value a given type of speech has is a "judgment for each per20 4
son to make, not one for the judges to impose upon him."
LikeJustice Powell, the majority in Sable declined to engage in a
further content discrimination by relegating sexually-oriented
messages "to a less robust form of judicial protection than that reserved for what the government deems to be more worthy subjects
of conversation." 20 5 Section 223(b)'s ban on indecency outlawed
commercial telephonic communication that "arouses normal sexual
196 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning
restrictions on sexually explicit materials which were not definitionally obscene).
197 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
198 Schauer, supra note 192, at 1277-79.
199 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978).
200 Id. at 746.
201 Id. at 747-48.
202 Id. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring).
203 Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
204 Id. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring).
205 See Brief of Appellant at 18, Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 109 S.Ct.
2829 (1989) (Nos. 88-515, 88-525).
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responses" in ordinary adults. 20 6 It is this sort of expression that
20 7
enjoys first amendment protection.
In refusing to uphold section 223(b)'s ban of merely "indecent"
telephone conversations, the Court laudably chose not to implement a rule which would lead to speculation about the spot that any
particular kind of speech would occupy in the hierarchy of first
amendment values. By emphatically stating that sexual expression
which is merely indecent is protected by the first amendment, and
that the government may regulate the content of such speech to
promote a compelling interest only if it chooses the least restrictive
means to do so, 208 the Court showed a clear conviction that sexually
explicit but not obscene speech should be held to the same strict
scrutiny standard as any other form of protected speech. Thus, the
Court took a definitional approach and did not embark on the slippery slope of declaring certain types of protected speech to be of
lower value than others. 209 In sum, the Court's decision in Sable acts
as a safeguard to first amendment rights because the Court refuses
to leave decisions about which forms of protected speech have more
or less value to the whims of judges.
2.

The Obscenity Holding

The Court's holding that section 223(b)'s ban on obscene telephone communications is constitutional 210 does little to change or
clarify the law of obscenity. In Sable, the Court did not deviate from
the premise, first enunciated in Roth, 2 11 that obscenity is not protected by the first amendment. 21 2 The Court's holding is problematic because the Court did not devote due attention to the reality
that dial-a-porn companies are subject to a national standard for obscenity if they want to stay in business.213
The Court's decision concerning obscenity seems difficult to
justify in light of the Miller Court's "contemporary community stan206 See id. (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985) (definition of "prurient" as including "lust" was unconstitutionally overbroad in that it
reached constitutionally protected materials that merely stimulated normal sexual responses)); see also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739 (indecent defined as "patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities").
207 See Brief of Appellant at 18, Sable (Nos. 88-515, 88-525).
208 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2836.
209 See Schauer, Categories and the FirstAmendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265, 295-96 (1981).
210 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2835.
211 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); see supra note 12 and accompary-

ing text.
212 Sable,
213 Id.

109 S. Ct. at 2835.
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dards" requirement. 21 4 The Miller Court, in adopting "contemporary community standards" as the standard by which obscenity is to
be judged, rejected the concept of a "national standard" of obscenity. 2 15 In Sable, the Court paid little heed to Sable's argument that

dial-a-porn requires a different rule because of the inherently national character of the interstate telephone network. Dial-a-porn
companies operate by sending out thousands of pre-recorded
2 16
messages at a time to persons who dial a special phone number.
Because these calls can be made locally or long distance, 2 17 dial-aporn services have little control over the final destination of their
outgoing messages. Moreover, such companies can be prosecuted
for violating the obscenity laws in any number of geographical
2 18
areas.
Because neither Miller nor prior obscenity decisions involved
such an inherently national medium, the Court erred in cursorily
analogizing Sable to Hamling 219 and Reide1220 and in automatically
applying the Miller Court's "contemporary community standards"
requirement to Sable.2 2 1 The federal mail system differs from the
interstate telephone system used by dial-a-porn providers in that a
mailed item must have an easily ascertainable destination. 2 2 2 Thus,
before sending sexually explicit materials to a customer, the distributor knows where the package is going and has an opportunity to
make sure that the enclosed materials are not obscene by that region's standards. Conversely, dial-a-porn companies, because of
the nature of their business, are not aware of the destination of each
message. Moreover, in declining to discuss Sable's plea that the telephone companies be required to block service to the least tolerant
communities, 223 the Court placed the responsibility of geographical
214

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying

text.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
Sable, 109 S.Ct. at 2832.
217 Id. Of the calls to Carlin Communications, Sable's New York affiliate, in 1983 and
1984, 80% were local and 20% long distance. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749
F.2d 113, 115 (2d Cir. 1984) (Carlin 1).
218 Sable, 109 S.Ct. at 2835.
219 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); see supra note 29.
220 United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); see supra note 43.
221 Sable, 109 S.Ct. at 2835-36.
222 See F. SCHAUER, supra note 29, at 129.
223 Sable, 109 S.Ct. at 2835. Sable's main argument against the obscenity ban was
that it placed dial-a-porn providers in a double bind. Sable stated:
Its inability to play adult messages to consenting callers from areas where those
messages are not obscene, for fear of later being prosecuted based on calls placed
from other, less tolerant communities, has obviously been created by Congress' re215

216
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screening entirely upon dial-a-porn providers. 2 24
The effect of the Court's decision is that unless Sable and other
dial-a-porn providers can develop a system for screening the locale
of incoming calls, they will, to stay in business, either tailor all of
their messages to the least tolerant communities or risk prosecution. 2 25 Neither of the options with which dial-a-porn companies

are left seems viable. The great number of calls that dial-a-porn
companies receive renders impracticable the use of operators to
screen geographical locations. 2 26 In order to develop a system that
can screen the locale of incoming calls, dial-a-porn companies may
need the cooperation of the phone companies. 22 7 If the phone companies will not cooperate, dial-a-porn companies may indeed be in a
228
"double bind."

The Court's decision that dial-a-porn providers are wholly responsible for developing methods of geographical screening reflects
a stalemate between the promotion of the capitalistic principle that
businesses should be able to exist where there is a market, and the
concept that the burden of geographical screening should not be
placed on phone companies, a burden that would force the phone
companies to rescue dial-a-porn companies from prosecution.
Thus, the Court's decision seems to be a judgment that although
Sable has a right to engage in the dial-a-porn business, the phone
2 29
company has a right not to condone that business.
However, in focusing on Sable's duty to find a "means for profusal to follow its constitutional obligation to regulate speech only in the least restrictive manner.
Brief of Appellant at 39, Sable (Nos. 88-515, 88-525).
224 Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2836.
225 Id.

at 2836.

226 See Enforcement of Prohibitions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the
Transmission of Obscene Materials, 49 Fed. Reg. 24,996, 25,000 (1984) (FCC rejected
scheme to screen child callers by requiring intervention by live operators who would
obtain access or identification codes from all callers because this scheme "would place
substantial economic and administrative burdens on the recorded service provider.").
227 Brief of Appellants at 37-38, Sable (Nos. 88-515, 88-525).
228 Id. at 40.

It is as though the Government said: "we will not enjoin (or induce the phone
company to suppress) your protected speech, but we will compel you either to suppress it yourself or accompany it-unless you convince your local phone company
to change its policy-with speech in which you do not wish to engage, which you
know to be unprotected, and for which you will be federally prosecuted."
Id.
229 Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, commented that "while we hold the Constitution prevents Congress from banning indecent speech in this fashion. we do not
hold that the Constitution requires public utilities to carry it." Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2840
(Scalia, J., concurring); see also,Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)

(heavily regulated public utility with a partial monopoly did not have to accord "due
process" when terminating electricity).
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viding messages compatible with community standards, ' 23 0 the
Court avoided addressing the application of the Miller Court's "contemporary community standards" requirement 23 ' to new communications methods that are national in nature and whose target
destinations may not be easily ascertained. Instead of dogmatically
adhering to prior decisions concerning other media, the Court
should have used a fairness analysis. An analysis of this sort would
attempt to create a rule that would, to the greatest extent possible,
allow the dial-a-porn provider to make an intelligent decision
2 32
whether or not to incur the risk of transmitting its messages.
Fairness is especially demanded because of the importance of first
amendment rights and the severity of section 223(b)'s criminal punishment. 23 3 Thus, "[the] solicitude for certainty and predictability"
should apply with greater force when dealing with section 223(b).234
Using such a framework, one possible solution would be to
judge the obscenity of materials at the point of distribution, rather
than by the standards of the destination community. 23 5 A second
possibility would be to set a threshold percentage of calls which
must come from a particular area before a prosecution using the
obscenity standards of that area could take place. This system
would be much fairer to dial-a-porn companies whose business is
primarily local.2 3 6 Both solutions would promote certainty and prevent a problem that concerns dial-a-porn providers: that prosecutors will travel to a less tolerant area, place a call to a dial-a-porn
service located in a more tolerant area, and then prosecute the provider for a section 223(b) violation using the standards of the less
tolerant community. 23 7 Furthermore, both solutions would be most
likely to eliminate "hard-core" pornography and preserve the less
"hard-core" for those who wish to hear it.
These solutions do not undermine the basic policies underlying
state regulation of obscenity, including "the interest of the public in
Sable, 109 S. Ct. at 2836.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
232 See Waples & White, Choice of Community Standards in FederalObscenity Proceedings: The
Role of the Constitution and the Common Law, 64 VA. L. REv. 399, 439 (1978).
233 Id. at 441.
234 Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 573 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 86-88 (1973) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959)).
235 Congress has provided that a federal offense can be prosecuted in any district in
which it was begun, continued, or completed. 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1984).
236 See supra note 219.
237 Brief of Appellant at 38, Sable Communications v. FCC, 109 S.Ct. 2829 (1989)
(Nos. 88-515, 88-525).
230
231
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the quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of
commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety
itself."238 Whereas children might find dial-a-porn naughtily enticing, adults are assumed to be capable of making rational and mature
decisions about how to live their lives; if they do not want to hear a
sexually explicit telephone message, they will not dial one. Thus,
there is no chance of dial-a-porn messages accosting the ears of unwilling adults. The mere fact that it is possible for someone to access dial-a-porn from a community that is not tolerant of such
messages does not imply that the community's moral environment
will be corrupted or the public safety threatened.
Moreover, such solutions would have value as precedent for
later cases involving new, high technology developments of national
scope. After Sable, however, it remains an open question whether a
new standard will be developed to define obscenity where the
speech involved is, as in Sable, necessarily available throughout the
nation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In Sable, the United States Supreme Court, in a two pronged
decision, determined the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)'s
prohibition of obscene and indecent telephone communications.
The Court's holding that the indecency prohibition violated the first
amendment is a victory for the first amendment insofar as it reaffirms the rights of adults to see, hear, and do that which may be
inappropriate for children. In coming to this conclusion, however,
the Court failed to apply the correct balancing test, ignoring the interest of parents in the control and upbringing of their children.
Even so, the Court then laudably applied a definitional approach to
section 223(b)'s indecency ban, declining to create intermediate categories of protected speech. The Court's decision therefore acts as
a safeguard of the right of ordinary citizens to decide what value any
particular type of protected speech has.
The Court's decision to uphold section 223(b)'s obscenity ban
demonstrates the problems involved with the application of current
obscenity law in an era of an ever-increasing number of technological developments in the area of communications. Until recently, the
law of obscenity has been primarily directed at modes of communication whose target destinations are easily ascertainable; with the
advent of dial-a-porn services in the early 1980s, courts were faced
with the task of applying obscenity law to an inherently national me238 Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 58.
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dium. The Court's decision in Sable fails to achieve this task. In
avoiding this important issue, the Court arrived at a conclusion
which, in effect, imposes a national standard of obscenity upon diala-porn providers. This standard is likely to put dial-a-porn providers
in the "double bind" of either tailoring their messages to the least
tolerant communities or risking prosecution by providing messages
that more tolerant communities desire.
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